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The Risk of Financial Hardship in Retirement: A Cohort Analysis 
The economic security of current and future generations of the elderly is a leading public 
policy concern, particularly as the population of the elderly soars in the United States. The elderly 
appear to be more economically secure than other age groups by some metrics. According to the 
Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), median net worth for the age 75 
and older population, at $265,000 in 2016, was higher than for all other age groups and also at an 
all-time high (in inflation-adjusted terms). Moreover, the social safety net provides considerably 
more protection for the elderly than other age groups through Medicare, Medicaid, SNAP, SSI, 
and other programs. Yet, other considerations point to greater risks facing the elderly. The poverty 
rate falls with age before age 65 but rises thereafter. The elderly are also at greater risk for 
catastrophic health care expenses related to physical disability and dementia. And the elderly, 
having largely left the labor force, have fewer ways to address economic vulnerabilities than 
younger individuals. 
Moreover, changes in the economic and demographic profile of the population mean that 
future cohorts of the elderly will face a different landscape in terms of economic security risks 
(Gale et al. 2018). Some factors will enhance their economic security compared with earlier 
generations—higher female labor force participation rates and greater real Social Security benefits, 
for example. Yet future generations of the elderly will also confront challenges relative to their 
earlier counterparts: longer life expectancies to finance and possibly lower rates of return on assets, 
for example. The balance sheets of today’s near elderly also suggest that they are less financially 
prepared for the years to come than earlier generations. According to the SCF, 77 percent of 
households approaching retirement age (with heads between the ages of 55 and 64) held some debt 
in 2016, up slightly from 74 percent in 1995. The median amount of debt for those with debt was 
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$31,000 in 2016, more than double the median in 1995 (adjusted for inflation). Median net worth 
was 3.1 times normal income for this group in 2016, little changed from 1995, even though a 
considerably smaller share of these households have defined benefit (DB) pensions to supplement 
their savings in retirement (37 percent in 2016, down from 53 percent in 1995). 
Much of what we know about economic insecurity among older Americans is based on 
patterns that have been observed in the current or past population of retired people (see, for 
example, Clark and Liu 2020). Given changes in demographics and the economic environment, 
the patterns of the past provide only limited information about the prevalence of hardship and 
economic insecurity of future generations of the elderly. This paper seeks to help remedy this gap 
by identifying factors earlier in life that are correlated with hardship when elderly and using those 
factors to predict future hardship for individuals who are now approaching retirement.  
In particular, using the Health and Retirement Study, a rich data set with over 20 years of 
information on the same households, we look at households as they are approaching their elderly 
years in the mid-1990s and then again when they are well into their elderly years in the mid-2010s. 
This exercise sheds light on how economic insecurity later in life (measured in a number of ways) 
is shaped by factors during late middle age. We use the results of this exercise to project the 
economic insecurity that the current generation of households in late middle age, with their 
different traits than earlier cohorts, will in old age. We go on to consider how changes across the 
cohorts in various specific factors—increasing debt burdens, longer careers, and different 
demographics—contribute to differences in predicted old-age hardship for the two cohorts. Of 
course, some factors might have a very different effect on future economic insecurity than they 
did in the past, most notably initial wealth because of the potential for asset returns to be different 
than they were for households approaching retirement two decades ago. Our final exercise that 
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effectively allows for different realizations of asset returns for those approaching retirement in 
2014 shows how the results would change if rates of return on assets turn out to be lower than for 
households who were nearing retirement in the mid-1990s.  
Our analysis suggests that, for most measures of economic insecurity, observable traits in 
late middle age predict that the incoming generation of retirees will face somewhat more hardship 
in old age than their earlier counterparts. For most measures, the prevalence of old-age hardship 
for women is projected to be little changed from that experienced by those in old age now. By 
contrast, men now in late middle age are projected to fare considerably worse when old than their 
earlier counterparts. As a result, although women have traditionally been more likely to experience 
most types of hardship in old age, the gender gaps are predicted to narrow or reverse for most of 
the measures that we explore. In counterfactual simulations, we find that reversing the increase in 
the share of the population represented by race and ethnicity groups that tend to have lower income 
and wealth undoes much of the predicted increase in old-age hardship. We also find that hardship 
would not be predicted to rise quite as much if the population currently in late middle age held 
amounts of debt that were more similar to the amounts held by cohort that was in late middle age 
two decades ago.  
The results, if they come to fruition, would have a material impact not only the affected 
individuals but also on government finances given that the government-provides a safety net that 
the economically vulnerable elderly population uses extensively. Exploring this possibility well in 
advance is particularly important given that households have limited options of their own to 
reverse their economic misfortunes once they are in old age. A long lead time, for example, allows 
individuals more years to do additional saving, the choice of raising their labor supply when still 
of working age, and the option to purchase insurance of various forms. It gives policymakers the 
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ability to create incentives for individuals to act now to increase their future economic security, 
and it also gives them more flexibility to make needed adjustments to the safety net. 
 
Past Research on Economic Security in Retirement 
A considerable literature exists on the economic security of the elderly; we do not review 
it in detail here. We do, however, highlight past research that is particularly relevant in order to 
provide context to our work here.  
One relevant strand of earlier literature looks at the retirement readiness of pre-retirees 
using contemporaneous information about the basic demographic characteristics and wealth of the 
pre-retiree population. Much of the focus is on whether households have sufficient wealth to meet 
their expected retirement needs, either in an absolute sense or relative to their pre-retirement 
standard of living. Some of these papers model optimal wealth accumulation and decumulation to 
gauge whether savings of pre-retirees are adequate (Engen et al. 2000; Scholz et al. 2006; Pang 
and Warshawsky 2014). Others assess retirement preparedness of households by projecting 
replacement rates to determine whether households can maintain their pre-retirement standard of 
living based on demographics, assets, and liabilities (Munnell et al. 2018). Microsimulation 
techniques have also been used to project not only economic security but changes in the factors at 
the individual level that shape that security (Butrica et al. 2007).  
This literature yields varying conclusions about the overall level of retirement 
preparedness, with many of the differences owing to conceptual issues (Gale et al. 2018). For 
example, some papers consider retirement savings to be adequate if individuals can expect to 
experience the average standard of living that they enjoyed during their younger years while others 
judge savings to be adequate only if individuals can expect to live at the standard of living they 
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experienced in the years immediately preceding retirement (which is likely to be higher given 
productivity growth in the economy). Another conceptual issue is whether the focus is on 
households having sufficient wealth to meet their expected retirement needs (either in an absolute 
sense or relative to their pre-retirement standard of living) or on households having enough 
resources such that they are insured against all types of risk; with most of the literature focusing 
on the former consideration. 
A second relevant strand of the earlier literature studies contemporaneous factors that 
contribute to economic insecurity among the elderly population. Costly health shocks can deplete 
a household’s savings, leaving them vulnerable (Coile and Milligan 2009). Family structure 
matters as well. For example, marriage provides risk protection in the event one spouse suffers an 
income, health or other shock, leading to married couples tending to have greater economic 
security in retirement than single individuals (Tamborini 2007). Interfamily transfers can deplete 
or increase an elderly household’s economic security.  
Our paper is distinct from both strands of earlier literature. It exploits many years of 
longitudinal data to assess both how households now nearing retirement will fare in old age and 
how they are likely to compare to earlier cohorts. We tie the observable traits of households in 
their pre-retirement years to a range of poor outcomes in old age. In doing so, we are able to capture 
both the effects of lack of preparation for expected needs and lack of insurance against downside 
risk. We focus on the later retirement years (aged 77 to 82) because those are the ones in which 
major risks such as widowhood, dementia, and physical disability are most likely to manifest 
themselves. Further, our use of a framework that links hardship in old age to earlier observable 
traits rather than using actuarial calculations to predict such hardship may pick up a richer set of 
channels that drive poor outcomes.  
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Data and Methods 
We use the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a longitudinal survey of individuals age 
50 and older that collects information about households’ demographic characteristics, their 
financial and economic situation, and their health.1 The HRS surveys individuals every two years, 
re-interviewing the same households from prior waves and periodically replenishing the sample 
with new birth cohorts as they surpass age 50. The HRS has been conducted on an ongoing basis 
since 1992, but we rely only on the 1994 and 2014 waves.2 From the 1994 wave, we examine 
respondents born between 1932 and 1937 (aged 57 to 62) and use information on factors that might 
influence their economic security 20 years later (when they are aged 77 to 82), including 
demographic, economic, financial, and health indicators.3 From the 2014 wave, we use information 
                                                             
1 Specifically, we use the RAND HRS which spans years from 1992 to 2014 (version 2) matched with the pension 
wealth data files from 1992 to 2010 compiled by Gustman et. al. (2014), the HRS fat files for the 12th wave, and the 
RAND HRS family data file spanning years from 1992 to 2014 (version 1). 
2 We refer to the 2nd wave of the HRS as the ‘1994 wave’ because all but two of the observations in our sample of 
those born in 1932 to 1937 are interviewed in 1994. A similar logic holds for the 12th wave of the HRS being 
referred to as the ‘2014 wave’—95 percent of observations in our sample of those born in 1952 to 1957 are 
interviewed in 2014. 
3 In creating our sample, we make the following sample restrictions. For the married households in the 1932 to 1937 
cohort, we limit the sample to individuals who respond to the 1994 wave of the HRS (3,564 observations) and then 
sequentially exclude those who having a missing ethnicity (7), those who are missing pension wealth from Gustman, 
et. al. (2014) in the 1994 wave (4), those who are missing predicted Social Security wealth from the 1st wave (29), 
those who are missing self-reported health in the 1994 wave (1), those who are missing self-reported details on 
health incidences, such as smoking and cancer (2), those who are missing number of resident kids or kids that live 
within 10 miles (155), those missing self-reported spouse health (147), those missing data on the value of the second 
house (29), and those missing information on our economic security variables in the 2014 wave (57). For the single 
male households in the 1932 to 1937 cohort, we limit the sample to individuals who respond to the 1994 wave of the 
HRS (341 observations) and then sequentially exclude those who are missing number of resident kids or kids that 
live within 10 miles (13) and those missing information on our economic security variables in the 2014 wave (3). 
For the single female households in the 1932 to 1937 cohort, we limit the sample to individuals who respond to the 
1994 wave of the HRS (815 observations) and then sequentially exclude those who are missing number of resident 
kids or kids that live within 10 miles (40), those who are missing self-reported details on health incidences, such as 
smoking and cancer (2), and those missing information on our economic security variables in the 2014 wave 
(12).For the married households in the 1952 to 1957 cohort, we limit the sample to individuals who respond to the 
2014 wave of the HRS (2,741 observations) and then sequentially exclude those who having a missing race and/or 
ethnicity (27), those missing self-reported spouse health (175), those who are missing predicted household Social 
Security wealth from the 10th wave (236), those who are missing number of resident kids or kids that live within 10 
miles (199), those who are missing self-reported health in the 2014 wave (1), those missing self-reported spouse 
health (17), those missing information on our economic security variables (18), and those missing the number of 
7 
 
on those same households, creating metrics of economic security and hardship at that time. The 
resulting data set enables us to see what factors in late middle age predicted economic insecurity 
for these individuals when they were well into their elderly years.  
The next step is to tap the 2014 survey for information on the population more recently in 
late middle age—those born between 1952 and 1957. We draw the same information on the factors 
that could contribute to future economic security as for their earlier counterparts in the 1994 wave. 
Based on what we have learned about how the economic security of the current generation of 
elderly was shaped their traits in late middle age, we project the future economic security of the 
incoming elderly generation.     
 
Measures of economic insecurity 
We assess economic insecurity and hardship among the elderly with a number of measures. First, 
we look at several measures related to the resources households have to finance their spending 
needs. We start with poverty, as it is the most commonly used metric to gauge whether a household 
has adequate income to afford a subsistence standard of living. Also, because wealth (in its 
financial, nonfinancial, and pension forms) is an especially important resource for the elderly, we 
also use a measure of resource adequacy that combines income and wealth, along the lines of the 
                                                             
household children (13). For the single male households in the 1952 to 1957 cohort, we limit the sample to 
individuals who respond to the 2014 wave of the HRS (449 observations) and then sequentially exclude those who 
having a missing race and/or ethnicity (3), those who are missing predicted household Social Security wealth from 
the 10th wave (50), those who are missing number of resident kids or kids that live within 10 miles (22), those 
missing the number of household children (9), those who are missing self-reported details on health incidences, such 
as smoking and cancer (1), and those missing information on our economic security variables (9). For the single 
female households in the 1952 to 1957 cohort, we limit the sample to individuals who respond to the 2014 wave of 
the HRS (945 observations) and then sequentially exclude those who having a missing race and/or ethnicity (5), 
those who are missing predicted household Social Security wealth from the 10th wave (103), those who are missing 
number of resident kids or kids that live within 10 miles (79), those who are missing number of children (6), those 
who are missing self-reported details on health incidences, such as smoking and cancer (6), and those missing 
information on our economic security variables (16). 
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measures used by Love et al. (2008) and Brown and Dynan (2017). We call this measure 
‘annuitized wealth,’ and it is designed to capture the expected annual resources that individuals 
would have to fund consumption and other expenditures were they to invest their accumulated 
wealth in an annuity and combine the payout from that annuity with other forms of income. 
To calculate this measure, we start by aggregating all sources of financial and non-financial 
wealth for each household. To this amount, we add predicted wealth from various sources. For 
those respondents and spouses who have not yet retired, we assume that their annual earnings will 
remain constant until their predicted retirement age. The HRS also provides a predicted Social 
Security retirement wealth measure for individuals and households that have not claimed Social 
Security retirement benefits; we add that amount, assuming currently scheduled benefits. We also 
add the HRS’s measure of predicted DB and defined contribution (DC) wealth (Gustman et al. 
2014). 
We then calculate a hypothetical annuitized value of wealth for HRS participants. For 
single people, the annuitized value is the amount of income a no-load annuity would pay for the 
expected remaining years of their lives, assuming life expectancies reported by the Social Security 
actuary and a real interest rate of 2.5 percent. For married people, this annuity would have one 
payout when both members are alive and a smaller payout when only one is alive. Following the 
convention of many annuities, we calculate the payout as a joint-and-two-thirds annuity, whereby 
the annuity pays a surviving spouse two-thirds the amount when both spouses are alive. Although 
this calculation overstates the value of an annuity one could actually purchase, given loading costs 
and the transactions costs from liquidating assets, it provides a rough conversion of wealth into an 
annual metric.  
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To this estimated payout, we then add other sources of regular income not captured in the 
wealth measure, including veterans’ benefits, welfare (as defined by the HRS), food stamps, and 
Social Security retirement benefits for those who are claiming. We do not include one-time or 
short-term sources of income, like insurance payments or unemployment insurance benefits, given 
that recent sources of such income would already be incorporated in wealth and would not likely 
constitute an important ongoing source of wealth.  
We use this comprehensive measure of annuitized wealth to assess economic insecurity in 
two ways. First, we use it to calculate an absolute measure of well-being based on the poverty 
threshold, with values below 150 percent of the threshold as indicating insecurity, as in Love et al. 
(2018). (We use a value higher than 100 percent because we think about the actual threshold taking 
into account the fact that many households have wealth to supplement their income.) We are also 
interested in the evolution of the measure over time, because a large decline in the measure may 
indicate that households are ‘living beyond their means’ and thus likely to face economic 
insecurity in the future. To do this, we take our measure of annualized resources for each household 
in both 1994 and 2014 and note whether the amount in the latter year has fallen by 30 percent or 
more. We adjust this calculation for changes in household size, using the joint-and-two-thirds 
annuity benchmark from above. For example, we would indicate that a household that has gone 
from a married couple to a single person has experienced a large drop in wealth if the annuitized 
wealth measure in the second period is less than 47 percent [2/3*(1-0.3)] of the annuitized wealth 
in the first period. 
We also look at material hardship among elderly households in 2014, using HRS data 
reporting consumption patterns that may indicate economic hardship. While these measures are 
correlated with other measures of economic hardship like poverty, many older people above the 
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poverty line also report material hardship (Levy 2015). Another difference between these measures 
and those based on income, wealth, and participation in means-tested program is that the thresholds 
do not depend on household size and composition. We identify a respondent as experiencing 
material hardship if the individual answered affirmatively to the following questions: 
(1) Food insecurity: ‘In the last two years, have you always had enough money to buy the 
food you need?’ 
(2) Medication cutbacks: ‘At any time in the last two years, have you ended up taking less 
medication than was prescribed for you because of the cost?’ 
We also identify a respondent as experiencing hardship based on whether they are 
participating in the means-tested programs of Medicaid or SNAP (food stamps) in 2014. By 
definition, participants in means-tested programs are experiencing measured economic insecurity, 
although the eligibility rules have multiple criteria that attempt to capture the complexity of 
economic insecurity.   
Table 1 here. 
Table 1 shows the means of these indicators in 2014 for respondents in our sample that 
were born between 1932 and 1937 (and thus who were 77 to 82 years old in 2014). We show 
means for the full sample and for men and women separately. All results are weighted using the 
person-level weights from the HRS to correct for the survey’s oversampling of Blacks, Hispanics, 
and Floridians. (We use weights throughout the analysis given that the outcomes of most interest—
the means of predicted realizations of different types of hardship—would otherwise be too high 
given the oversampling of race and ethnicity groups that tend to be poorer. For the observed 
outcomes of individuals born between 1932 and 1937, we use the combined person-level and 
nursing home resident weight from the 2014 wave of the HRS. In the regression analyses to 
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generate the predicted outcomes, we weight the estimation by the person-level weight from the 
1994 wave of the 1932 to 1937 birth cohort. For the predicted outcomes of individuals born 
between 1952 and 1957, we use the person-level weight from the 2014 wave of the HRS.)  
For the full sample, the poverty rate, at 6.5 percent, suggests lower poverty than does the 
Census Bureau measure (which was around 12 percent for individuals over the age of 75 in 2014), 
but the lower level is consistent with other work suggesting that the Census measures may 
overstate the actual degree of poverty (Hurd and Rohwedder 2006; Bee and Mitchell 2017). The 
shares of this cohort having a low value of annuitized wealth or experiencing a big decline in 
annuitized wealth was almost double the share in poverty, at around 12 percent. Around 5 percent 
of respondents in this group reported having to cut back their medication, being food insecure, or 
using food stamps.  
 By nearly all measures, women were more likely to be experiencing economic insecurity 
than men at older ages, consistent with findings in other studies (see, for example, Brown and 
Dynan 2017). Only 3.6 percent of men between ages 77 and 82 were in poverty in 2014, compared 
with 8.6 percent of females. The share of elderly men with annuitized wealth below 150 percent 
of the poverty threshold, at 7.4 percent in 2014, was also less than half as much as the comparable 
share for women, which was 16 percent in 2014. (That said, men were a bit more likely to have 
experienced a large decline in the measure than women.) Elderly men were also somewhat less 
likely to be cutting back their medications or on Medicaid than their female counterparts and less 
than half as likely to use food stamps.  
Factors potentially predicting economic security 
We use a variety of individual and household characteristics of the 1932 to 1937 birth 
cohort sample as of 1994 to predict future economic insecurity. We look at real household wealth 
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in 1994, disaggregated by source. Different sources of wealth could have a differential impact on 
future economic security because of different asset returns, different tax treatment, different 
liquidity, and behavioral factors. We have separate measures for housing wealth and non-housing 
wealth. We also make use of the HRS projections of Social Security wealth assuming individuals 
claim at their full retirement age, as well as projected wealth in DB plans and actual wealth in DC 
accounts. 
We also include separate terms for different types of outstanding household debt. As 
Brown, et al. (2020) and others have highlighted, a key feature distinguishing households now 
approaching retirement from their earlier counterparts is that they hold more debt. Table 2 shows 
SCF data documenting how the share of households between ages 55 and 64 holding different 
types of debt and median outstanding balances for borrowers have evolved since the early 1990s. 
The share of households in this age group holding debt of different types has changed little on net, 
except for education debt where the share has doubled. But, for all types of debt, the median 
amount of debt for borrowers in this age group has risen considerably. As documented by Dynan 
and Kohn (2007), greater holdings of debt probably reflect both developments related to the supply 
of credit (for example, financial innovation) and developments related to demand for credit (such 
as the rise in real home prices over time and less stigma associated with holding debt). The trend 
toward more holding of debt by older households makes it very important that we estimate the link 
between debt in late middle age and future hardship for the 1994 wave so that we can control for 
the greater debt of households in the 2014 when projecting the likelihood that they will face 
economic insecurity. 
Table 2 here. 
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For our analysis, we separate debt between mortgage and non-mortgage debt. Ideally, we 
would like to include separate terms for different types of non-mortgage debt like vehicle debt and 
credit card balances, as research suggests that different types of debt have different relationships 
to the likelihood of financial distress among older households (Lusardi et al. 2018). However, we 
are only able to include a single term capturing all non-mortgage debt because the HRS does not 
provide information about the separate components.  
Continued labor force participation as an individual approaches retirement might have a 
differential impact on future retirement security than other forms of income. Thus, we include 
income divided between labor and non-labor income. 
We also use measures of initial health status and health history for the respondent and the 
spouse where present. Nearly every person over 65 years old has comprehensive health insurance, 
yet out-of-pocket health care costs can be high and drain household savings, particularly for those 
with a chronic illness or a history of acute illness that predicts future health care expenses. Thus, 
we include indicators of self-reported fair or poor health for the respondent and the spouse if 
present. We also include an indicator of whether the respondent ever smoked.  
In addition, we include educational background, which may be correlated with preferences 
(such as patience and risk aversion) as well as behavioral traits (such as the ability to plan ahead 
and financial sophistication). Education may also be related to health, employment opportunities 
when older, and other factors that we are not fully able to control for with the other variables along 
these lines that we have included in the analysis. 
We use respondent-level data for the regressions, and we run regressions separately for 
married respondents, single male respondents, and single female respondents given the different 
insurance and risks that come with having a spouse and being of different genders. All regressions 
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include measures of family composition. We include counts of the number of children the 
respondent has, as well as separate counts of children living at home with the respondents and 
children living outside the home but within 10 miles.  
Appendix Table 1 shows summary statistics for the factors described above for the 
respondents in our sample from the 1994 wave. (Recall that we are restricting the analysis to 
households who were between age 57 and 62 in 1994.) Several of the results are of particular note. 
Social Security is a very considerable source of wealth, on average, for all groups. Men have 
substantially more wealth than women, by all measures, yet mean debt is higher for men than for 
women (suggesting that the debt may be partially financing assets such as homes and vehicles). 
Women have, on average, more children living at home and more children living nearby than the 
other groups.   
Appendix Table 2 shows summary statistics for the same late-middle-age traits as 
Appendix Table 1 for the generation born in 1952 through 1957 and observed in the 2014 wave of 
the HRS. Social Security is not only still a considerable source of wealth but, for the median 
household, somewhat larger than other types of wealth put together. Looking at the medians for 
key variables (in the lower part of the table), several patterns stand out. First, women look better 
off than their earlier counterparts shown in Appendix Table 1 in terms of earned income and Social 
Security wealth (owing to their longer careers in paid work). Social Security wealth is a little higher 
for the full sample but down a bit for men. However, non-Social-Security wealth is much lower 
relative to the 1994 cohort for all groups. The size of the decline in the median for females is 
smaller than the increase in the median of their Social Security wealth, but the same comparison 
for men suggest that they are much worse off on net. Although the value of primary residences 
looks to be little changed, the means for debt on those residences are considerably higher. 
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Consistent with the results from the SCF in Table 2, the value of non-mortgage debt is also 
considerably higher (with the mean nearly three times as high as for the 1994 cohort).  
  
Estimation and simulation 
We establish the relationship between the characteristics of respondents age 57 to 62 years 
old in 1994 with measures of economic insecurity 20 years later, in 2014. We separately estimate 
the relationship for married respondents, single females, and single males. One important 
consideration is that a number of survey respondents die in the period between observations, and 
the factors that predict economic security may also predict survival. Thus, we estimate the 
relationship between economic security and predictors in two steps. First, we predict the 
probability that the survey respondents we observe in the first wave survive 20 years later, using 
our economic security predictors. Then we estimate the likelihood of being economically insecure 
conditional on surviving, correcting for the non-randomness of the surviving sample using the 
Heckman correction.4 We estimate these equations using ordinarily least squares separately for 
different household types in 1994: single men, single women, and married couples. 
As discussed before, our outcome measures are the probability of having various traits that 
would be associated with being economic insecure in 2014, when the respondents are between 
ages 77 and 82. These traits include being in poverty; having ‘annuitized wealth’ that leaves the 
household that the respondent is living in below 150 percent of the poverty line; facing a 30 percent 
or more decline in household annuitized wealth (adjusted for any changes in marital status) 
                                                             
4 To ensure the model is identified, we include in the first stage (the estimation of the probability of being alive at 
age 77 to 82) an indicator for whether or not the respondent ever smoked, but exclude whether or not the respondent 
ever smoked from the second stage (the estimation of the effect on the economic security measures).  
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between 1994 and 2004; reporting experiencing material hardship in the form of food insecurity 
or medication cutbacks; and participating in the means-tested programs of Medicaid or SNAP. 
The explanatory variables are all characteristics of the respondent and the household in 
which the respondent was living in 1994. With these estimates in hand, we then turn to 
understanding what our findings mean for the incoming generation of retirees. We apply the 
estimated effects of the factors predicting future economic insecurity for the 1994 cohort of 
respondents in late middle age to the 2014 cohort of respondents in late middle age. All of our 
predicted factors from 1994 are also included in the 2014 questionnaire, allowing for out-of-
sample predictions with the 2014 cohort of near-retirees. 
To interpret this exercise as a prediction of economic insecurity in 2034 requires the 
assumption that each factor would have the same predictive effect on economic insecurity between 
2014 and 2034 as it did in 1994 and 2014. This assumption is strong, but we nonetheless believe 
that this exercise is useful in establishing a benchmark in understanding to what extent future 
economic insecurity of the elderly might be different than in the past based on observable 
demographic, social, health, and economic changes. Among the other factors that could have a 
different impact on the 2014 cohort than on the 1994 cohort, the wealth of people now nearing 
retirement might evolve differently as they approach old age in ways that influence future 
economic insecurity. In particular, asset returns appear to have significantly boosted the 
accumulated lifecycle wealth of households in their older years since the early 1990s (Sabelhaus 
and Feiveson 2019), but the global decline in the real interest rates (Del Negro et al. 2017) and the 
possibility that the recent period was an above-average realization (on net) suggest that the coming 
generation of elderly may not be nearly as fortunate in the returns they enjoy. We address this 
limitation of our baseline analysis below through an additional exercise that effectively allows for 
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different realizations of asset returns for those approaching retirement in 2014. (Although we only 
concretely explored the possibility of different realizations of asset returns, we acknowledge that 
there are many other factors that might play out differently for the more recent cohort. For example, 
self-reported health may have different implications for future health now than in the past.) Finally, 
we note that this population is heavily reliant on government programs like Social Security, 
Medicare, Medicaid, and SNAP; changes to these programs could affect the likelihood of hardship 
among future cohorts of elderly, although we do not explore the impact of any possible changes in 
this paper.  
 
Results 
In all, we run 21 separate regressions (7 measures of hardship modelled for three different 
groups—married households, single men, and single women), with the regressions each having a 
vector of explanatory variables. Between the number of coefficient estimates and the collinearity 
of some of the explanatory variables, looking at the individual estimates as a way of divining which 
factors matter is not particularly useful. Thus, we do not present these detailed results here 
(although they are available upon request). We can say that many of the point estimates make 
sense. For example, having more Social Security wealth, owning more housing, and having 
children living within 10 miles is generally associated with a lower probability of hardship. 
Proceeding to the next stage, Figure 1 compares observed rates of economic insecurity in 
2014 for the sample that was age 57 to 62 in 1994 (age 77 to 82 in 2014) with the predicted 2034 
rates for the sample that was age 57 to 62 in 2014 (and will be age 77 to 82 in 2034). Given that 
we are using the regression results for the earlier cohort to make the predictions for the more recent 
cohort, the differences can be attributed to changes in the observable demographic, economic, and 
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financial characteristics of the late-middle-age population. For every measure but the poverty rate, 
the results suggest an increase in the share of the older population that is economically vulnerable. 
For example, 4.1 percent of the age 77 to 82 population was food insecure in 2014. Using the 
composition and characteristics of the 1952 to 1957 birth cohort and applying the relationship 
between the pre-elderly factors and future economic vulnerability observed for the 1932 to 1937 
birth cohort, the food insecure rate is predicted to be 5.5 percent (an increase of about one-third). 
Notably, the predicted share of people in old age on Medicaid is predicted to rise from 8.4 percent 
in 2014 to 9.7 percent in 2034 (an increase of 15 percent). This change, if realized, would have 
important implications for federal and state budgets, which already devote around $100 billion of 
dollars a year to Medicaid spending on the elderly population.     
Figure 1 here. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the observed and simulated levels of economic security for each gender. The 
figures have some striking implications. First, by most metrics, today’s female near-retirees are 
not predicted to experience more hardship in old age than the cohort of females that are currently 
in their late 70s and early 80s. The predicted shares of women cutting back medications or 
experiencing food insecurity are higher but the predicted shares for other types are hardship are 
little changed or lower. Second, today’s male near-retirees are expected to experience considerably 
more hardship in old age than their earlier counterparts by all metrics that we consider. As a result, 
the gender gap that we documented in Table 1, whereby females experience more hardship of 
nearly all types in old age, is predicted to narrow and in some cases reverse. The implied 
improvements in the relative old-age outcomes for women suggest that the greater economic 
security resulting from the higher female labor force participation of the more recent cohort helps 
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offset factors that are likely to diminish economic security (such as less DB pension coverage and 
less accumulated financial and non-financial wealth).  
To better understand what drives the implied deterioration in outcomes for the full sample, 
we next explore some possible factors. We describe these analyses below and show the results in 
Figure 4. 
Figure 4 here. 
The changing indebtedness of households 
As noted above, more recent generations of near elderly have higher levels of debt than 
prior generations, which shows up in both housing and non-housing debt. Such burdens could 
presage greater insecurity for the incoming generation in retirement. Indeed, survey data analyzed 
by Lusardi et al. (2020) suggest that households now approaching retirement are uneasy with their 
current debt level, with more than one-third of people age 56-61 reporting being over-indebted. 
As a crude way of assessing how big of a role greater indebtedness plays in the differences 
we observe between the data on the 1932 to 1937 birth cohort and the predictions for the 1952 to 
1957 birth cohort, we re-run the analyses, normalizing the average debt levels of the 1952 to 1957 
birth cohort to the levels of the 1932 to 1937 birth cohort. Thus, we remove the overall increase in 
the debt burden and compare the new simulations to the prior simulations and the observed 
outcomes of the earlier birth cohort. Note that this exercise will understate the role of debt since it 
only removes the increases on the intensive margin; it does not capture the fact that there are more 
households in late middle age holding debt now compared with two decades ago (as indicated in 
Table 2). 
Comparing the first columns in each grouping in Figure 4 (which show the original 
simulation) with the second columns, we find that reversing the increase in debt modestly reduces 
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predicted old-age hardship for most measures. The exception is for the poverty rate, which is 
predicted to be higher than in the base case when the increase in debt is reversed. This latter result 
may seem surprising, but we note that debt might have a complex relationship with predicted 
hardship since the poorest households presumably have little access to credit.  
Changing demographics 
The racial and ethnic makeup of the population has changed over the last two decades. As 
shown in Table 3, the share of the HRS sample in late middle age that reported being White was 
about 7 percentage points lower in 2014 than in was in 1994 (on a weighted basis). The share 
reporting being Black rose by a little more than a percentage point (to 11 percent) and the share 
reporting being Hispanic rose by 5 percentage points (to 10 percent). To assess the importance of 
these changes, we divide our simulation results for the 1952 to 1957 birth cohort by race and 
ethnicity and reweight the sample to match the race and ethnicity distribution of the 1932 to 1937 
birth cohort. We then recalculate population-wide predictions of financial hardship, with the 
results shown in the third columns of each group in Figure 4.5 
Removing the effects of changing race and ethnicity makes a considerable difference in the 
predicted share of the population experiencing different types of economic insecurity. For 
example, the predicted poverty rate of the 1952 to 1957 birth cohort is 6 percent but, holding the 
distribution fixed to 1932 to 1937 proportions, the predicted poverty rate would only be 5.2 
percent. Also of note, the predicted Medicaid enrollment rate households in their late 70s and early 
80s in 2034 would be materially lower if the race and ethnic composition were unchanged. The 
                                                             
5 Specifically, we divide the sample into six unique cells – white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, other non-
Hispanic, white Hispanic, black Hispanic, and other Hispanic. The weighted shares of the cells, using the HRS 
combined person-level and nursing home resident weight from the 2014 wave, are as follows: white non-Hispanic 
(0.8561), black non-Hispanic (0.0791), other non-Hispanic (0.0158), white Hispanic (0.0385), black Hispanic 
(0.0004), and other Hispanic (0.0101). We then calculate the predicted outcomes for each cell for the 1952 to 1957 
cohort (weighted by the person-level weight from the 12th wave), multiply the predicted outcome for each cell by 
the weighted share of the 1932 to 1937 cohort, and sum the products to get the population average.   
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Medicaid enrollment rate would be 8.6 percent (instead of 9.7 percent), only slightly higher than 
the observed 8.4 percent for the 1932 to 1935 cohort. 
We note that these results are not inconsistent with the view that the lower observed 
financial, non-financial, and private pension wealth for today’s near-retirees documented in 
Appendix Tables 1 and 2 is playing a central role in raising predicted hardship. Wealth disparities 
across different race and ethnicity groups continue to be large and concerning. According to the 
SCF, the ratio of the wealth of the median White non-Hispanic household to the median Black 
household and the median Hispanic household has fluctuated between 5 to 1 and 10 to 1 for more 
than 20 years. 
Career lengths 
While many of the factors discussed would intuitively increase economic insecurity, one 
major factor that could counteract it is the longer careers of the later cohort of retirees. Working 
longer helps households build wealth and strengthen their balance sheets more generally. Indeed, 
Butrica and Karamcheva (2020) find that older households with more debt have a higher 
propensity to work and a later expected date of retirement, consistent. Working longer can also 
forestall public and private pension benefit claiming, which could ultimately increase the stream 
of income one receives upon claiming. Bronshtein et al. (2018) finds that delaying retirement by 
three to six months has the equivalent impact on retirement standard of living as a one percentage 
point increase in saving of labor income over 30 years. And what we observe in the data is that of 
those not yet retired, the median worker in the 1952 to 1957 birth cohort expects to work two years 
more than the median worker in the 1932 to 1937 birth cohort. 
To assess the potential of this factor, we rerun our models including a variable of predicted 
remaining labor earnings, which we calculated for the outcomes variables that relied on annuitized 
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wealth. Because we have predicted retirement for the 1952 to 1957 birth cohort, we then run the 
simulations with this predicted labor wealth variable. The result of this exercise is shown in the 
third column of Figure 4. The additional labor earnings lower the predicted rates of most types of 
hardship, although the changes are fairly modest. Overall, the results suggest that we should not 
expect the longer careers people may be expecting to offset most of the effects of other factors that 
are likely to weaken economic security.   
Uncertainty about asset returns 
 As stated before, the above exercise holds all of the observed factors constant in terms of 
their predicted impact on future economic security, although all of the factors are likely to have a 
different impact on the incoming generation than the current generation. The financial security of 
today’s elderly has been enhanced by the capital gains they have experienced on the saving they 
did prior to retirement. One limitation of our baseline analysis is that it assumes that the returns on 
assets experienced by individuals nearing retirement now will be the same as those enjoyed by 
those who were nearing retirement in the mid-1990s. Real equilibrium safe interest rates have 
dropped sharply since the early 1980s—as can be seen in Figure 5a, for example, the real rate of 
interest on one-year Treasury rates securities has declined from an average exceeding 7 percent 
between 1980 and 1985 to an average of -1 percent over the past five years. Rates in recent years 
have been held down by the easy monetary policy put in place to support the economy in the wake 
of the Great Recession, but, many economists believe that safe interest rates will remain very low 
even after central banks normalize monetary policy (see, for example, Kiley and Roberts 2017, 
and Horneff et al. 2018). That said, the decline in real safe interest rates largely preceded the period 
we used for our regressions, so it may not be a large source of bias for our results. (Indeed the real 
one-year Treasury rate averaged 0.8 percent per year over this period). 
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 Figure 5 here. 
 Uncertainty about rates of return on risky assets poses a larger challenge, as risk asset 
returns even when averaged over long periods of time. Figure 5b and Figure 5c show 20-year 
growth rates of real stock prices and real home prices, respectively. The mean of the 20-year 
growth rate of real stock prices series since the late 1800s is 2.1 percent but the standard deviation 
of the series is 3.2 percentage points. Importantly, the 1994 HRS cohort of near-elderly that we 
study enjoyed average annual real returns of 4.5 percent on stock that they held—more than double 
the average over history. The mean of the average 20-year growth rate of real home prices series 
(which goes back to the early 1900s) is 0.4 percent, with a standard deviation of 1.2 percentage 
points. The 1994 HRS cohort of nearly elderly on average experienced annual growth of 1.4 
percent in real home prices between 1994 and 2014, also well above the longer-term historical 
average. 
 As a rough way of judging the possible importance of lower rates of return on risky assets 
for the coming generation of the elderly, we redo our simulation assuming that 2014 near-elderly 
households start with smaller amounts of stocks and housing assets than they actually had. It is 
difficult to map an assumption about lower returns to lower starting levels of wealth because the 
calculation turns out to be very sensitive to the timing of the lower returns as well as the speed 
with which older households are spending down their assets. Thus, to keep things very simple, we 
assume that the more recent cohort starts with half the amounts of stocks and housing as they 
actually have. As can be seen in Figure 6, this change does indeed increase predicted rates of 
several types of hardship. The predicted poverty rate is 0.4 percentage points higher than in the 
base case (going from 6 percent to 6.4 percent), predicted Medicaid enrollment is 1.1 percentage 
point higher (going from 9.7 percent to 10.7 percent), and the rate of low annuitized wealth is 1.1 
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percentage point higher (going from 14.8 percent to 15.9 percent). One might be surprised not to 
see even larger changes given the dramatic counterfactual assumption, but we note that the part of 
the population that has any of these risky assets at all in later middle age is better off than most of 
the households that tend to face the types of hardship we consider. 
 
Conclusion  
Our paper represents a distinct contribution to the retirement security literature in that it 
uses a rich longitudinal data set that spans 20 years to show how economic insecurity in old age 
relates to observable demographic, socioeconomics, and financial traits in late middle age for the 
cohort of the US population nearing retirement in the mid-1990s. It then uses these findings to 
examine how the cohort nearing retirement in the mid-2010s, which has different traits on average 
than the earlier cohort, is likely to fare in old age. In doing so, our paper complements the literature 
that focuses on actuarial calculations (i.e. calculations that consider how well the accumulated 
wealth of a cross-section of near-retirees will meet their likely consumption needs in retirement). 
Our results imply that a material share of the individuals approaching retirement age in the 
mid-2010s are likely to face hardship in their late 70s and early 80s. One in twenty are predicted 
to be unable to purchase needed medications or food on a consistent basis. One in ten is predicted 
to be on Medicaid, and one in seven is predicted to have annuitized resources that are below 1.5 
times the poverty line for their household. If realized, this incidence of hardship will be somewhat 
higher than for the cohort born 20 years earlier (around 1 to 2 percentage points higher for most 
measures). Women (who traditionally have experienced much higher economic insecurity in old 
age) are predicted to fare about the same as their earlier counterparts, but men are predicted to see 
considerably higher rates of hardship in old age. Simulations that effectively undo some of the 
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changes in traits of the more recent cohorts suggest that increases in the share of the population 
accounted for by race and ethnicity groups that tend to have lower wealth and income explain 
much of the increase in predicted hardship.   
Our unique approach involved the strong assumption that the traits of the cohort that was 
in late middle age in the mid-2010s will have the same association with hardship in old age as did 
the traits of the cohort that was in late middle age twenty years earlier. This paper touched on some 
of the factors that could change these relationships (different asset returns and the ability to work 
longer) but future research should further explore how these relationships might change and what 
influence the changes might have on the results. 
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Table 1: Summary measures of economic security for 1932-1937 birth cohort, in 2014 
 All Male Female 
 (N=2,047) (N=823) (N=1,224) 
 Mean Mean Mean 
In poverty (including nursing homes) 0.065 0.036 0.086 
Cutback Meds 0.049 0.044 0.053 
Food Insecure 0.041 0.031 0.049 
Receiving SNAP 0.052 0.028 0.070 
Receiving Medicaid 0.084 0.074 0.091 
Annuitized wealth decline by 30%+ 0.121 0.136 0.111 
Annuitized wealth under 150% FPL 0.124 0.074 0.160 
 
Notes: Observations are weighted by the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) provided the 
combined person-level and nursing home resident weight for the 2014 (12th) wave of the HRS. 
All outcomes are measures in the 2014 (12th) wave of the HRS.  
Source: Authors’ analysis of the Health and Retirement Study. 
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Table 2: Evolution of debt among households with heads age 55-64 
 Share holding 
debt 
(%) 
 Median for  
those holding debt 
(thousands of 2016 $) 
 1992 2016  1992 2016 
Mortgage Debt on Primary Residence 39 42  72.95 111.00 
Other Residential Debt 6 6  41.93 100.00 
Credit Card Debt 44 44  1.68 2.30 
Education Debt 11 22  5.53 19.00 
Vehicle Debt 30 34  11.36 17.19 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of the Survey of Consumer Finances. 
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Table 3: Distribution of Race and Ethnicity 
 Born 1932 to 1937 Born 1952 to 1957 
 All Alive in 2014 All 
 (N= 4,217) (N=2,047) (N=3,135) 
 Mean Mean Mean 
Race    
White 0.877 0.895 0.805 
Black 0.095 0.080 0.108 
Other 0.028 0.026 0.087 
Ethnicity    
Non-Hispanic  0.945 0.951 0.896 
Hispanic 0.055 0.049 0.104 
 
Notes: The sample of all observations from the 1932 to 1937 birth cohort, observations are 
weighted by the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) provided person-level weight for the 1994 
(2nd) wave of the HRS. The sample of observations from the 1932 to 1937 birth cohort alive in 
2014 are weighted by the HRS provided the combined person-level and nursing home resident 
weight for the 2014 (12th) wave of the HRS. Observations from the 1932 to 1937 birth cohort 
are considered alive in 2014 if they responded to the HRS survey in the 2014 (12th) wave. The 
remaining respondents from the 1932 to 1937 birth cohort were interviewed in 2015. The sample 
of observations from the 1952 to 1957 birth cohort are weighted by the HRS provided person-
level weight for the 2014 (12th) wave of the HRS. 
Source: Authors’ analysis of the Health and Retirement Study. 
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Appendix Table 1: Summary statistics for 1932-1937 birth cohort, in 1994 
 All Male Female 
 (N=4,217) (N=1,948) (N=2,269) 
 Mean Mean Mean 
Age 59.07 59.09 59.04 
Number of Living Children 3.337 3.256 3.409 
Number of Resident Children 0.304 0.289 0.318 
Number of Children Living within 10 miles 1.126 1.043 1.202 
Self-Reported Health (1=Excellent, 5=Poor) 2.620 2.619 2.620 
Spouse Self-Reported Health 2.522 2.460 2.589 
Ever Smoked? 0.644 0.747 0.551 
HH Pre-claiming Social Security Wealth (at FRA)  278,420 298,861 259,915 
Respondent DB Pension Wealth  97,360 156,472 43,850 
Respondent DC Pension Wealth  20,010 23,384 16,955 
HH Wealth, Excl. Social Security  775,201 644,911 282,243 
     Excl. Social Security and DB/DC Pensions  686,019 772,419 607,804 
     Excl. Social Security, DB/DC Pensions, and Housing 527,018 575,243 483,361 
HH Value of Primary Residence  379,999 425,813 338,527 
HH Value of Secondary Residence 20,109 20,996 19,306 
HH Net value of Other Real Estate  86,508 92,187 81,366 
HH Net value of Vehicles  24,447 26,786 22,329 
HH Debt on Primary Residence  35,624 41,772 30,058 
HH Debt on Secondary Residence  3,309 3,829 2,838 
HH Other Debt  4,600 5,980 3,352 
HH Earned Income  54,356 64,558 45,121 
HH Unearned Income, Including Government Transfers  38,169 40,141 36,383 
Education: Less than High School 0.288 0.283 0.293 
Education: High School 0.348 0.295 0.397 
Education: Some College 0.187 0.199 0.177 
Education: College or More 0.176 0.223 0.133 
    
MEMO: Median values    
HH Pre-claiming Social Security Wealth (at FRA)  303,285 328,531 260,758 
HH Wealth, Excl. Social Security  375,466 430,360 327,120 
     Excl. Social Security and DB/DC Pensions  245,678 262,622 228,735 
     Excl. Social Security, DB/DC Pensions, and Housing 106,743 123,178 94,883 
HH Value of Primary Residence 128,769 135,547 127,075 
HH Earned Income  39,099 52,131 27,803 
HH Unearned Income, Including Government Transfers  13,971 13,728 15,306 
 
Notes: Dollar amounts in 2018 dollars. Observations are weighted by the Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS) provided person-level weight for the 2nd wave of the HRS. All outcomes are 
measures in the 1994 (2nd) wave of the HRS. Only observations that have non-missing 
responses for each variable are included in the sample. 
Source: Authors’ analysis of the Health and Retirement Study  
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Appendix Table 2: Summary statistics for 1952-1957 birth cohort, in 2014 
 All Male Female 
 (N=3,135) (N=1,352) (N=1,783) 
 Mean Mean Mean 
Age 59.00 58.98 59.03 
Number of Living Children 2.635 2.658 2.615 
Number of Resident Children 0.395 0.434 0.360 
Number of Children Living within 10 miles 0.660 0.653 0.666 
Self-Reported Health (1=Excellent, 5=Poor) 2.687 2.691 2.683 
Spouse Self-Reported Health 2.577 2.559 2.595 
Ever Smoked? 0.540 0.596 0.490 
HH Pre-claiming Social Security Wealth (at FRA)  321,594 324,706 318,771 
Respondent DB Pension Wealth  73,304 76,800 70,134 
Respondent DC Pension Wealth  57,092 73,542 42,170 
HH Wealth, Excl. Social Security  908,221 1,085,752 747,178 
     Excl. Social Security and DB/DC Pensions  727,689 893,681 577,113 
     Excl. Social Security, DB/DC Pensions and Housing 507,683 644,382 383,680 
HH Value of Primary Residence  229,130 228,549 229,657 
HH Value of Secondary Residence 73,186 104,762 44,543 
HH Net value of Other Real Estate 61,083 81,075 42,947 
HH Net value of Vehicles  23,754 13,166 7,911 
HH Debt on Primary Residence  66,210 68,146 64,453 
HH Debt on Secondary Residence  9,475 10,292 8,734 
HH Other Debt  11,947 15,737 8,509 
HH Earned Income  75,581 82,281 69,504 
HH Unearned Income, Including Government Transfers  47,613 53,099 42,637 
Education: Less than High School 0.129 0.136 0.123 
Education: High School 0.244 0.247 0.241 
Education: Some College 0.290 0.291 0.289 
Education: College or More 0.337 0.326 0.347 
    
MEMO: Median values    
HH Pre-claiming Social Security Wealth (at FRA)  311,083 315,919 308,090 
HH Wealth, Excl. Social Security  294,987 295,161 293,696 
     Excl. Social Security and DB/DC Pensions  184,352 180,342 187,768 
     Excl. Social Security, DB/DC Pensions and Housing 53,042 47,738 58,346 
HH Value of Primary Residence 159,126 159,126 159,126 
HH Earned Income  48,496 53,884 42,030 
HH Unearned Income, Including Government Transfers  11,822 10,863 12,932 
 
Notes: Dollar amounts in 2018 dollars. Observations are weighted by the Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS) provided person-level weight for the 2014 (12th) wave of the HRS. All outcomes 
are measures in the 2014 (12th) wave of the HRS. Only observations that have non-missing 
responses for each variable are included in the sample. 
Source: Authors’ analysis of the Health and Retirement Study. 
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Figure 1. Percent of 77-82 year old population economically vulnerable, by metric of 
vulnerability and birth cohort. 
 
Notes: When calculating the outcome for the 1932 to 1937 cohort, observations are weighted by 
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) the combined person-level and nursing home resident 
weight for the 2014 (12th) wave of the HRS. When calculating the outcome for the 1952 to 1957 
cohort, observations are weighted by the HRS provided person-level weight for the 2014 (12th) 
wave. In the regression analyses, observations are weighted using the 1932 to 1937 cohort’s 
person-level weight from the 1994 (2nd) wave.  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Health and Retirement Study 
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Figure 2. Percent of 77-82 year old female population economically vulnerable, by metric of 
vulnerability and birth cohort. 
 
Notes: When calculating the outcome for the 1932 to 1937 cohort, observations are weighted by 
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) the combined person-level and nursing home resident 
weight for the 2014 (12th) wave of the HRS. When calculating the outcome for the 1952 to 1957 
cohort, observations are weighted by the HRS provided person-level weight for the 2014 (12th) 
wave. In the regression analyses, observations are weighted using the 1932 to 1937 cohort’s 
person-level weight from the 1994 (2nd) wave. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Health and Retirement Study 
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Figure 3. Percent of 77-82 year old male population economically vulnerable, by metric of 
vulnerability and birth cohort. 
 
Notes: When calculating the outcome for the 1932 to 1937 cohort, observations are weighted by 
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) the combined person-level and nursing home resident 
weight for the 2014 (12th) wave of the HRS. When calculating the outcome for the 1952 to 1957 
cohort, observations are weighted by the HRS provided person-level weight for the 2014 (12th) 
wave. In the regression analyses, observations are weighted using the 1932 to 1937 cohort’s 
person-level weight from the 1994 (2nd) wave. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Health and Retirement Study 
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Figure 4. Percent of 77-82 year old population (1952-57 birth cohort) economically vulnerable, 
by metric of vulnerability, baseline simulation and simulations with other assumptions. 
 
Notes: Baseline corresponds to original simulation for the 1952 to 1957 birth cohort based on 
estimates from the 1932 to 1937 cohort. The constant demographics analysis holds the racial and 
ethnic composition fixed to 1932 to 1937 birth cohort proportions by creating six cells – white 
non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, other non-Hispanic, white Hispanic, black Hispanic, and 
other Hispanic. The racial and ethnic composition is fixed at the shares of the 1932 to 1937 
cohort alive in the 2014 (12th) wave of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) weighted using 
the combined person-level and nursing home resident weight for the 2014 (12th) wave of the 
HRS. The (weighted) shares of the cells are as follows: white non-Hispanic (0.8561), black non-
Hispanic (0.0791), other non-Hispanic (0.0158), white Hispanic (0.0385), black Hispanic 
(0.0004), and other Hispanic (0.0101). The longer careers analysis includes a variable in the 
estimation and simulation for individuals’ expected remaining labor earnings. When calculating 
the outcome for the 1932 to 1937 cohort, observations are weighted by the HRS the combined 
person-level and nursing home resident weight for the 2014 (12th) wave of the HRS. When 
calculating the outcome for the 1952 to 1957 cohort, observations are weighted by the HRS 
provided person-level weight for the 2014 (12th) wave. In the regression analyses, observations 
are weighted using the 1932 to 1937 cohort’s person-level weight from the 1994 (2nd) wave.  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Health and Retirement Study 
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Figure 5a. Real 1-Year Treasury Rate 
 
Note. The real Treasury rate in period t is calculated as the nominal Treasury rate in period t 
minus CPI inflation between period t and period t+1. 
Source. Authors’ calculations based on data from the Board of Governors from the Federal 
Reserve System and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
  
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
1962 1974 1986 1998 2010
%
39 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5b. 20-Year Average Annual Growth in Real Stock Prices 
 
Source. Authors’ calculations based on data from Robert Shiller. 
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Figure 5c. 20-Year Average Annual Growth in Real Home Prices 
 
Source. Authors’ calculations based on data from Robert Shiller. 
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Figure 6. Percent of 77-82 year old population (1952-57 birth cohort) economically vulnerable, 
by metric of vulnerability, baseline simulation and simulation with halved assets. 
 
Notes: Baseline corresponds to original simulation for the 1952 to 1957 birth cohort based on 
estimates from the 1932 to 1937 cohort. The halved assets analyses reduces the assets of the 
1952 to 1957 cohort by half to account for lower expected asset returns relative to the experience 
of the 1932 to 1937 birth cohort. When calculating the outcome for the 1932 to 1937 cohort, 
observations are weighted by the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) the combined person-level 
and nursing home resident weight for the 2014 (12th) wave of the HRS. When calculating the 
outcome for the 1952 to 1957 cohort, observations are weighted by the HRS provided person-
level weight for the 2014 (12th) wave. In the regression analyses, observations are weighted 
using the 1932 to 1937 cohort’s person-level weight from the 1994 (2nd) wave.  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Health and Retirement Study 
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